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FOREWORD: LIMITING RAICH 
by 
Randy E. Barnett· 
INTRODUCTION 
On Monday, November 29th, 2004, at 10:30 a.m., I rose to argue the case 
of Gonzales v. Raich i in the Supreme Court on behalf of Angel Raich and 
Diane Monson. On Monday, June 6th, 2005, at 10:00 a.m., the Court 
announced its decision. Even today it is painful to read the opinions in the case. 
I am saddened for my clients, and the thousands like them, whose suffering is 
alleviated by the use of cannabis for medical purposes, as recommended by 
their physicians and permitted by the laws of their states, but who are 
nevertheless considered criminals by the federal government. I am saddened for 
the millions of voters in the ten states who enacted compassionate relief laws to 
allow these seriously ill persons to obtain cannabis without becoming 
criminals, at least under state law. And I am saddened for the Constitution, 
which established a system of limited and enumerated powers that had been 
virtually eliminated since the 1940s before being partially revived in the cases 
of United States v. Lopei and United States v. Morrison. 3 
My sadness was only slightly mitigated by the clear and ringing 
endorsement of our position in the dissenting opinions of Justices O'Connor 
(joined by the Chief Justice and by Justice Thomas) and Thomas. These stand 
as testimony to the plausibility, nay the correctness, of the approach we urged 
upon the Court. With their opinions in the United States Reports, none dare call 
our claims frivolous, completely impractical, or inevitably doomed. When a 
theory gains the support of three justices with so disparate approaches to the 
Constitution, it could just as easily have gained the support of two more justices 
inclined to put a commitment to federalism above a commitment to national 
power. In assessing the long-term effect of this undeniable defeat for 
federalism, then, we must remember that, in the history of the Supreme Court, 
the future has often been presaged by cogent dissenters who later came to be 
considered more principled than the majority.4 
• Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of Law. I thank Scott D. Scheule 
for his research assistance. 
i Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
2 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
3 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
4 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (Curtis, l, dissenting), Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
743 
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Nevertheless, with its decision in Raich, six justices at once dashed the 
hopes of medical cannabis users and those who believe in the value of 
federalism to protect individual liberty. Given this setback, what hope is left for 
the principle of limited national power, so staunchly endorsed by the late-Chief 
Justice Rehnquist in his opinions in Lopez and Morrison? Will the New 
Federalism survive the demise of its greatest champion?5 
The superb articles in this Symposium do little to raise hopes. They argue 
alternatively that Lopez and Morrison never comprised a serious federalism 
revival, that the doctrines announced by these cases were too unstable to have 
lasted, or that little, if anything, of these cases survives the Court's ruling in 
Raich. In this Foreword, I do not mean to take issue with any of these 
contentions, except perhaps the last, and I urge serious students of the 
Constitution to read each and every article in this issue. Instead, I intend to 
describe how a future majority of the Supreme Court, once again willing to 
apply the "first principles,,6 announced by the Chief Justice in Lopez and 
reaffirmed in Morrison-principles that no Supreme Court in our history has 
ever expressly disclaimed--can limit the Court's decision in Raich. Where 
there is a will to do so, there is certainly a way. 
THE WAY 
In considering what is left of federalism after Raich and how a future 
Court can limit the reach of the decision, we need to isolate three distinct 
issues: first, the difference between "facial" and "as-applied" challenges; 
second, the distinction between "economic" and "noneconomic" conduct; and, 
third, the scope of the "broader regulatory scheme" doctrine. 
Facial Challenges Survive Intact 
In one important respect, the holdings of Lopez and Morrison survive 
completely intact: a statute that is on its face entirely outside the powers of 
Congress described by the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses is 
unconstitutional. 7 Given that this proposition was doubted by both courts and 
scholars for the more than fifty years during which the Court failed to find that 
Congress had exceeded its powers--even once-this is no small matter. In this 
regard, it is highly significant that the majority opinion in Raich took pains to 
214 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
5 One cannot help but wonder if the Chief Justice's weakened condition may have 
prevented him from forging the sort of consensus that enabled federalism to prevail in Lopez 
and Morrison. 
6 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 ("We start with fIrst principles. The Constitution creates a 
Federal Government of enumerated powers. "). 
7 See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2231 n.3 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
("Because respondents do not challenge on its face the CSA's ban on marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 841(a)(I), 844(a), our adjudication of their as-applied challenge casts no doubt on this 
Court's practice in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison. In those cases, we 
held that Congress, in enacting the statutes at issue, had exceeded its Article I powers.") 
(citations omitted). 
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remain, however unfaithfully, within the framework of both Lopez and 
Morrison. Given what we know about the persistent resistance of the four 
dissenters in those cases, we can be confident that there were not five votes to 
reverse them. Distinguished though they were in this "as-applied" challenge to 
the Controlled Substances Act, the cases themselves remain authority in future 
facial challenges to statutes more closely resembling the Gun Free School 
Zones Act and the Violence Against Women Act. 
On the other hand, even facial challenges have been undermined by Raich 
to the extent its treatments of the economic-noneconomic distinction and the 
"broader regulatory scheme" doctrine have made it harder to sustain such 
challenges. The expansive definition of economic activity could adversely 
affect facial challenges, but the broader regulatory scheme doctrine was 
probably always nascent, as it was mentioned in Lopez itself.8 I comment 
further on these two theories below. 
What of the viability of as-applied challenges after Raich? While making 
such challenges less likely to prevail, because of its expanded construction of 
federal power, the Court never denies that such challenges can be brought. 
Wickard v. Filburn,9 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,!O and Katzenbach 
v. McClung!! were all as-applied challenges. While Raich now joins this 
unsuccessful list, in none of these cases did the Court ever deny the availability 
of such a challenge. If a future Court wishes to make such challenges easier to 
sustain or confronts a set of facts to which the power of Congress under the 
Commerce Clause may not constitutionally be applied, Raich will provide no 
precedent against so ruling. 
In Raich, the government offered two arguments for why the Congress 
could reach the activity in question while respecting the precedents of Lopez 
and Morrison. First, they argued that the activity in question was economic in 
nature and thus conformed to the distinction emphasized in Morrison. Second, 
it argued that, even if the conduct at issue was noneconomic, it could still be 
reached because doing so was essential to a broader regulatory scheme that 
could be undercut unless the conduct was covered. In Raich, the Court 
principally relied on the second of these claims, while also accepting a 
significantly altered version of the first. I now turn to the future implication of 
both aspects of the Court's decision. 
The Larger Regulatory Scheme Doctrine 
The government contended that Lopez implicitly recognized an exception 
to the generalization of Morrison that limits the substantial effects doctrine to 
intrastate activities that are economic in nature.!2 In Lopez, Justice Rehnquist 
8 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
9 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. III (1942). 
10 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
II Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
12 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,611 (2000) ("[I]n those cases where we 
have sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity's substantial 
HeinOnline -- 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 746 2005
746 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:4 
asserted that the Gun Free School Zone Act was "not an essential part of a 
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be 
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.,,13 From this single 
statement, the government constructed an exception to the holding in Morrison 
that limited the reach of Congressional power under the "substantial effects" 
doctrine to intrastate economic activity. According to this proposed exception, 
Congress can reach wholly intrastate noneconomic activity if doing so is an 
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity that could be undercut 
unless such intrastate noneconomic activities were included in the scheme. 
Although we resisted the recognition of this exception in our brief, we 
argued that it was nevertheless "essential" to reach our class of activities to 
enforce the CSA. 14 By oral argument, our stance had changed. In order to 
defend our claim that the relevant class in our as-applied challenge was 
"cannabis cultivated and used for medical purposes as authorized by state law," 
we decided to embrace rather than resist the "larger regulatory scheme" 
exception. This then enabled us to contend that it was not essential to the larger 
regulatory scheme of the CSA to reach the class of activities with our particular 
characteristics. Not only was our class small in size as compared with the larger 
market for recreational marijuana, but its potential size was confined by the 
requirement that use be for medical purposes. Additionally, the fact that it was 
regulated and restricted by state law effectively separated this class from the 
broader illegal market. 15 
In Raich, the majority accepted the existence of the "larger regulatory 
scheme" exception to Morrison, though this doctrine could just as easily be 
considered a fourth distinct rationale for evaluating the reach of the Commerce 
and Necessary and Proper Clauses, in addition to the three identified in Lopez. 16 
In other words, in addition to the "substantial effects" rationale for reaching 
intrastate activity that is economic in nature per Morrison, Congress may also 
effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic 
endeavor. "). 
13 514 U.S. at 561. 
14 Brief for Respondents at 35, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (No. 03-
1454) ("Nothing in Lopez suggests that, by this single sentence, the Court was providing an 
escape route by which Congress may expand its powers to reach wholly intrastate 
noneconomic activity with no substantial effect on interstate commerce."). 
15 Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (No. 
03-1454) ("But a limiting principle ... was identified by the Court in Lopez in which the 
government is asserting that if it's an essential part of a broader regulation of economic 
activity to reach this activity, then it may be reached."). 
16 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59: 
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second, 
Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may 
come only from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes 
the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate 
commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 
(citations omitted). 
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reach intrastate activity-whether economic or not-if doing so is essential to a 
larger regulatory scheme that could be undercut unless the activity is reached. 
Although the Court rejected our argument that it was not essential to reach 
the class of activities in our case, in the future, Raich could easily be limited to 
its facts. That is to say, a future court could find that, while it may have been 
essential to the larger regulatory scheme constituted by the CSA to reach the 
medical use of cannabis permitted by state law-especially in light of the 
fungible nature of the commodity being cultivatedl7-this claim may not be 
true in a future case. In other words, Raich could be construed simply as having 
adopted a limited "fungible goods" rationale for why it is essential to the larger 
prohibition of a national market in a commodity that even the local cultivation 
and possession of such a commodity also be reached. 
The tougher issue for a future Court seeking to limit Raich is the level of 
scrutiny to be used to make the assessment that reaching an intrastate 
noneconomic activity is "essential." The majority in Raich adopted the most 
deferential version of the rational basis test. This is, perhaps, the most 
dangerous aspect of the Court's holding (and Justice Scalia's concurrence). 
Any heightened scrutiny provided by Lopez and Morrison could be evaded by a 
traditional rational basis approach to determining whether it is "essential" to 
reach the intrastate activity in question. 
On the other hand, in Raich, Congress did make explicit findings in the 
CSA that it needed to reach all such controlled substances. All a future Court 
need do to reconcile Raich with Lopez is to stress that these congressional 
findings satisfy the heightened rationality review implicit in Lopez. 18 This 
characterization of Raich would explain why the Court spent so much effort 
justifying, as opposed to merely reciting, the conclusion that Congress had 
offered in its "findings." 
The level of scrutiny to be afforded the conclusion that it is "essential" to a 
larger regulatory scheme to reach wholly intrastate noneconomic activity is one 
of the less well-theorized or defended aspects of the Court's opinion in Raich. 
In essence, it simply asserted that this was the appropriate level of scrutiny, a 
conclusion that seemed also to be assumed without analysis or defense by 
Justice Scalia in his concurrence. If Raich has a point that is vulnerable to 
future revision by the Court, this is it. It would be simple for a future Court to 
declare: "But of course the determination of 'essential' cannot be solely within 
the discretion of Congress to reach, lest the doctrine swallow the enumerated 
powers scheme. In Raich, it really was rational to consider the intrastate 
17 See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2206 (2005) ("[R]espondents are cultivating, 
for home consumption, a fungible commodity for which there is an established, albeit illegal, 
interstate market."). 
18 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,614 (2000): 
As we stated in Lopez, '''[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular 
activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so. '" 
Rather, '" [w ]hether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to 
come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a 
judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court. ", 
(citations omitted). 
HeinOnline -- 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 748 2005
748 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:4 
possession and cultivation of cannabis to be essential to the larger regulatory 
scheme." Such a reinterpretation of Raich would be especially warranted given 
that the term "essential" suggests a higher standard than Marshall's 
interpretation of "necessary" in McCul/och.19 
The Economic-Noneconomic Distinction 
In Lopez, the Court noted that the activity in question-possessing a gun 
within one thousand feet of a school-was not an economic activity. In 
Morrison, the Court stressed that, in all its Commerce Clause decisions 
utilizing the "substantial effects" doctrine, the underlying activity was 
economic in nature. 20 Althou~h the relevance of this fact was questioned by 
Justice Breyer in his dissent, I a requirement that intrastate activity reached 
under the "substantial effects" doctrine be economic in nature could be viewed 
as a judicially administrable criterion by which the necessity of reaching such 
activity pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause can be assessed,z2 In other 
words, when Congress reaches inside a state to regulate or prohibit wholly 
intrastate activities because of their effect on interstate commerce, requiring 
that these activities be economic in nature provides some assurance that doing 
so is a truly necessary means to effectuate the permissible end of regulating 
interstate commerce. 
In Raich, the government contended that the cultivation of cannabis was 
economic in nature because it affects the illicit market in marijuana and 
substitutes for a product available in the illegal market which Congress sought 
to prohibit.23 We strongly resisted this contention, arguing that if an activity 
was economic simply because it substitutes for a market product or service or 
because it affects an economic market, then any activity could be deemed to be 
economic and the reason for the Court invoking the economic/noneconomic 
distinction would be defeated. 
19 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,413 (1819) ("If reference be had to its use, in 
the common affairs of the world, or in approved authors, we find that it frequently imports 
no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another. "). 
20 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611. 
21 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 657 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[W]hy should we give 
critical constitutional importance to the economic, or noneconomic, nature of an interstate-
commerce-affecting cause?"). 
22 See 1. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprndence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 581, 625 (2002) ("[L]imiting Congress to the regulation of local 
economic activity ensures that such regulations will, in most circumstances, be plainly 
adapted and really calculated to achieve some legitimate end connected with the interstate 
economy. "). 
23 Brief for the Petitioners at 12, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (No. 03-
1454) ("Respondents' conduct is economic activity that is subject to congressional control 
because it occurs in, and substantially affects, the marijuana market generally. Home-grown 
marijuana displaces drugs sold in both the open drug market and the black drug market 
regulated by the CSA."); id. at 37 ("[R]espondents' manufacturing, distribution, and 
possession activities themselves 'involved economic activity' ... [because they] are 
producing a fungible commodity for which there is an established market and are doing so 
for their own use when they would otherwise be participants in a regulated market."). 
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Going forward, it is very important that the Court in Raich failed to rely 
upon, or even mention, the government's sweeping theory of "economic." 
Instead, the Court found the activity to be economic relying solely on a single 
forty-year old dictionary definition. Here is what the majority says, in its 
entirety: 
Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated by 
the CSA are quintessentially economic. "Economics" refers to "the 
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities." Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 720 (1966). The CSA is a statute that 
regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities 
for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market. 
Prohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of 
commerce is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating 
commerce in that product. Such prohibitions include specific decisions 
requiring that a drug be withdrawn from the market as a result of the 
failure to comply with regulatory requirements as well as decisions 
excluding Schedule I drugs entirely from the market. Because the CSA is 
a statute that directly regulates economic, commercial activity, our 
opinion in Morrison casts no doubt on its constitutionality?4 
As Justice O'Connor observed,25 no explanation was given for why this 
particularly broad definition was chosen over several other more narrow 
definitions. Broad as it is, however, the definition used by the Court is 
considerably narrower than the theory urged upon it by the government, and the 
Court's definition of "economic" is far from unlimited. It would exclude any 
personal conduct that does not involve "the production, distribution, and 
consumption of commodities." Reading a book, for example, or having sex. So 
too, most violent crimes, such as the one at issue in Morrison, do not involve 
the production, distribution, or consumption of commodities. As a result, much 
law that is within the traditional police power of states lies outside this 
definition of economic, which (according to Morrison) cannot be aggregated 
for purposes of finding a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
Having said this, the Court's declared definition of "economic" is indeed 
exceedingly broad. A future Court, however, could narrow it in one of two 
ways. First, a court could decline to consider this single archaic dictionary 
definition as dispositive. Second, a court could treat the Court's analysis of 
"economic" activities as dicta in light of its primary reliance upon the "larger 
regulatory scheme" doctrine that permits Congress to reach noneconomIC 
activity. 
It is potentially significant that the Court's proposed definition of 
"economic" came in its effort to distinguish Morrison in Part IV of its opinion, 
not in its affirmative defense of the constitutionality of the statute in Part III 
which seems more clearly to echo the "larger regulatory scheme" rationale that 
was, after all, rooted in Lopez itself. Because the "larger regulatory scheme" 
rationale allows Congress to reach some noneconomic behavior, its effort to 
24 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195,2211 (2005) (footnote omitted). 
25 Id. at 2224-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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further distinguish Morrison via its unwarranted definition of "economic" was 
unnecessary to decide the case, and therefore was dicta. 26 Perhaps the spirit of 
Morrison is alive after all. 
CONCLUSION 
Raich looms large now because it came as such a disappointment to those 
who admired Lopez and Morrison and hoped these cases presaged a broader 
New Federalism revolution. But as it recedes into the past, a Court seeking to 
limit the powers of Congress could resume movement in that direction by a 
series of baby steps before needing to confront Raich head on. If and when it 
does, the "doctrine" established by the Court in Raich will seem remarkably 
narrow, fragile, and easy to distinguish or subtly modify. Indeed, limiting Raich 
will be far easier for the Court than was any limitation in Raich of Lopez and 
Morrison-cases that the Court took pains to leave in place despite the hostility 
towards them shared by at least four of the justices in the majority. 
The happy little secret of the two hundred year history of the Commerce 
Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause is that no Supreme Court-not the 
Marshall Court or even the New Deal Court-has had the guts to say out loud 
that there are no judicially enforced limits on the powers of Congress under the 
Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause and that, as a result, the 
enumerated powers scheme is hereby judicially repealed. No Court has had the 
gall to frankly admit it was amending the Constitution. Remember that even the 
New Deal Court held Wickard over for reargument to the following year and 
declined to issue an opinion that would have ceded all discretion to Congress to 
defme the limits of its powers.27 Federalism lives as a "first principle" of 
constitutional law because no Court has had the temerity to kill it outright. And 
if the New Deal Court could not take that step, neither will a future Court. 
Provided, of course, that those who value federalism fight to keep it alive inside 
and outside of the courts despite setbacks of the sort represented by Gonzales v. 
Raich. 
26 On the other hand, the Court's explicit discussions of the "larger regulatory scheme" 
doctrine and the definition of "economic" both appear in Part IV of its opinion. See Raich, 
125 S. Ct. at 2210-11. The argument in the text that the Court's expansive definition of 
"economic" activity is dicta depends on characterizing its primary argument for the statute's 
constitutionality in Part III as more closely reflecting the "larger regulatory scheme" doctrine 
it later explicitly discusses in Part IV. 
27 See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHlNKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 218 (1998) (describing 
Justice Jackson's flirtation with an opinion containing, in Jackson's words, a "frank holding 
that the interstate commerce power has no limits except those which Congress sees fit to 
observe ... "). 
